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Abstract— Utility networks are part of every nation’s critical 
infrastructure, and their protection is now seen as a high priority 
objective. In this paper, we propose a threat awareness architecture 
for critical infrastructures, which we believe will raise security 
awareness and increase resilience in utility networks. We first 
describe an investigation of trends and threats that may impose 
security risks in utility networks. This was performed on the basis 
of a viewpoint approach that is capable of identifying technical and 
non-technical issues (e.g., behaviour of humans). The result of our 
analysis indicated that utility networks are affected strongly by 
technological trends, but that humans comprise an important 
threat to them. This provided evidence and confirmed that the 
protection of utility networks is a multi-variable problem, and thus, 
requires the examination of information stemming from various 
viewpoints of a network. In order to accomplish our objective, we 
propose a systematic threat awareness architecture in the context of 
a resilience strategy, which ultimately aims at providing and 
maintaining an acceptable level of security and safety in critical 
infrastructures. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate partially via 
a case study the application of the proposed threat awareness 
architecture, where we examine the potential impact of attacks in 
the context of social engineering in a European utility company. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The protection of critical infrastructures is considered to be 
essential for the orderly functioning of a society, its economy and 
national sovereignty [1]: nations are actively looking towards the 
protection of critical infrastructures. Further, the European 
Commission and United States Department of Homeland 
Security both emphasise the importance of critical infrastructures 
and the need for their protection. Protection is concerned with 
ensuring the functionality, continuity and integrity of 
infrastructures to deter, mitigate and neutralise a threat, risk or 
vulnerability [2]. Research on the emerging area of critical 
infrastructures has resulted in providing rules, legislation and 
good practice guidelines towards their protection. Such research 
is usually funded by the European Commission in Europe, and by 
the Department of Homeland Security in United States. 
Specifically, the Council of European Union identified the 
sectors of energy and transport to be of vital strategic importance 
[2]. The energy sector includes the subsectors of electricity, oil 
and gas. Additionally, the transport sector includes the subsectors 
of road, rail, air, inland waterways transport as well as the ocean 
and short-sea shipping and ports. Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) are used in utility networks for the monitoring, control and 
automation of operational plants. Due to the importance of 
critical infrastructures, the European Commission introduced in 
[2] an action plan where it proposes the development of a 
framework consisting of five pillars, namely: preparedness and 
prevention; detection and response; mitigation and recovery; 
international cooperation; criteria for the ICT sector. 
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Home Security defined in 
[3]  the need for a resilience framework in critical infrastructures, 
focused on the abilities of robustness, resourcefulness, rapid 
recovery, and adaptability. Providing protection in terms of 
security, safety and resilience in utility networks is inherently 
considered to be of vital importance. This is also due to the fact 
that in the past few decades we have experienced a significantly 
increased demand on utilities resulting in an increased rate of 
automation in network controls and interconnections. This also 
resulted in increasing the dependencies amongst various kinds of 
utility networks. 
Having identified the importance of protecting critical 
infrastructures, we undertook a holistic examination of protective 
means. Our research was initiated by performing an investigation 
of trends that bear the potential to become future threats, and 
propose a future protective mean against them. To the best of our 
knowledge, such an approach towards the protection of critical 
infrastructures is absent. Specifically, the former investigation 
will result in providing proactive knowledge concerning threats 
mostly in utility networks, and facilitate the identification of risks 
since threats are an important element in risk assessment [1]. 
That information will operate as a stepping-stone towards 
providing resilience in ICS via future protection based on threat 
awareness [4]. It is noteworthy that in existing approaches 
technical threats are examined, leaving other threat factors 
underemphasised (e.g., organisation policies, human behaviour). 
Yet, in most cases, situation awareness (SA) stages are not 
clearly defined, and thus they impose a high level of ambiguity 
with regard to ‘situational awareness’, which is often confused 
with the term ‘situation recognition’ (the latter being the first 
stage towards achieving SA). 
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. 
Section II provides information on related work. Section III 
clarifies on the methods used for gathering trends and threats. In 
section IV, we provide prerequisite information on resilience and 
the fundamentals of SA. In section V, we present our threat 
awareness approach for utility networks, and demonstrate the 
application of the proposed architecture through a case study in 
section VI. Conclusions are discussed in section VII. 
II. RELATED WORK 
SA has received much attention from researchers and 
organisations for its application in achieving cyber security and 
has been lately proposed by ICS-CERT1 to provide a basic step 
toward securing critical infrastructures. This statement has been 
reinforced in a recent systematic literature review performed in 
[5], where a set of application areas for SA have been identified. 
These areas include ICS, command and control systems, and 
operations management. Most of the research using SA has been 
in the context of ICS. SA is also examined in [6] under the 
context of critical infrastructures. Specifically, a list of promising 
approaches for addressing SA in critical infrastructure are 
examined and compared. In the following, we elaborate on a list 
of representative work done with regard to achieving cyber 
security in ICS via SA.  
An SA system based on information collected from critical 
infrastructure is presented in [7]. The authors elaborate on a 
concept and system that is capable of providing critical 
infrastructure under a common operating picture. This is done to 
provide decision-making at different management layers. Their 
proposed SA for critical infrastructure and networks (SACIN) 
framework combines existing approaches, i.e., agent-based 
brokered architecture and data fusion. SACIN has been 
implemented and evaluated, as well. Nevertheless, topics as 
dependencies amongst networks and information flow are 
considered as future research for the project. 
A wide-area situational awareness (WASA) framework for the 
protection of critical infrastructures is proposed in [8]. The 
WASA framework provides a hybrid solution that includes the 
presence of humans for the monitoring of emergency situations, 
and context awareness to protect functional services. The need 
for monitoring systems in a distributed manner led to the use of 
existing technologies (i.e., the Internet) as a mean to extend it. 
Specifically, WASA consists of two phases, viz. setup and 
commissioning, and development. The former is responsible for 
configuring and initialising the framework, and the latter 
provides a set of services (e.g., normalisation of data, prevention 
and detection, etc.). WASA is considered to be a framework, and 
therefore, implementation and testing is yet to be confirmed. 
A distributed agent-based protection system for smart grids is 
proposed in [9]. SA was identified as being able to enhance the 
security and reliability in power transmission systems. Therefore, 
the use of a distributed protection approach was perceived as a 
mean to gain SA. The proposed approach included the 
demonstration of a distributed protection system load shedding 
strategy, and reputation-based trust and retransmission 
mechanisms for the detection of cyber-attacks. 
An SA architecture for smart grids is proposed in [10]. The 
authors of the paper propose a system’s architecture that provides 
SA for SCADA devices and their operations in a smart grid 
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environment. This architecture is intended to provide topological 
and status information of SCADA devices, and information on 
devices in the smart grid environment. This information will 
eventually help in detecting security incidents in smart grid 
environments. Main components of the architecture consist of a 
set of network sensors; a SCADA gateway; a database, and a 
control centre. In particular, the gateway is used to collect all data 
gathered by sensors; information is stored using a schema in the 
database; the command centre is used as an interface and 
interprets information provided by the database by performing 
state based traffic analysis. 
In addition to these research approaches there are several other 
towards achieving SA [5], which mostly make use of anomaly 
detection algorithms, intrusion detection, identification of 
networks traffic regularity, etc. Nevertheless, none of them cope 
with issues stemming from a non-technical point of view, and are 
based on the fusion of data gathered from various sensors or 
agents [6]. Furthermore, in the examined approaches there is no 
explicit reference to information exchange mechanisms amongst 
other networks to elevate SA (except from SACIN and WASA), 
which is something that may result in achieving a higher level of 
security and resilience. Information sharing consist of an 
important topic, which has been also strongly recommended in 
the incident handling guidelines provided by the National 
Institute Standards and Technologies (NIST) in [11], and in 
European Union’s Cyber Incident Reporting System, overviewed 
by ENISA in [12]. 
 
Fig. 1. Viewpoints for utility networks 
III. CURRENT AND EMERGING TRENDS AND THREATS 
In this section, we provide information on the methods we 
have used for gathering and analysing trends and threats, as well 
as, information about their quantification.  
A. Methods 
The method used for collecting information with regard to 
technological trends and threats follow the pattern of information 
collection, analysis and collation. For the analysis of 
technological trends and future threats, we have used a viewpoint 
approach. This was applied to enable a broader view of the 
system, i.e., a representation of the whole system from the 
perspective of a related set of concerns. The viewpoints we 
propose for application in utility networks are: Organisation, 
Technology, and Individual (OTI). OTI is partially derived from 
IAEA and depicted in Fig. 1. More specifically, the three 
viewpoints are concerned with: The organisation viewpoint, with 
the groups of people who work together in an organised way for 
a shared purpose as well as any type of policies, processes and 
procedures in the organisation; The technology viewpoint, with 
the implemented technologies in a system including the software, 
hardware and network components, as well as any type of 
communication amongst them; The individual viewpoint, with the 
way a single person or thing acts or behaves in a particular 
situation or under particular conditions. 
Regarding the analysis of gathered information, we applied a 
basic qualitative research analysis. This approach suits for 
research problems characterised by the following: the sample size 
of data can be relatively small; the collection of data can be based 
on that of OSINT; the interpretation of data can be based on a 
combination of researchers’ perspective and data collected. 
Specifically, in this paper, the classification of data was 
performed on the basis of the proposed OTI viewpoints, which 
involved the use of an eclectic approach to match the examined 
data. During this process, the identified trend or threat is mapped 
onto one of the viewpoints. This is done by forming a series of 
questions to identify the source of each trend/threat. Examples of 
questions are: Is the trend in conflict with any of the 
organisation’s policies? Does the threat stem from a hardware 
fault? Is the threat a result of employees’ behaviour? (… etc.). In 
case the categorisation is not clear, the definition of the 
threat/trend has to be refined and re-examined on the basis of the 
defined questions.  
In order to identify the emerging technological trends and 
threats, we conducted a review of the latest information provided 
by major consulting firms and organisations. The information 
refer to both ICS and IT systems since there is increasing 
integration between them. Being aware of the latest information 
not only helps in achieving a better view of the trends and threats 
for utility networks but will also provide hints towards achieving 
appropriate SA.  
B. Trends and threats 
A trend can be defined as a general development or change in 
a situation or in the way that people behave. A technological 
trend consists of a trend relating to, or involving technology. An 
example of a technological trend could be that of ‘Bring Your 
Own Device’ (BYOD) policy, which many organisations are 
pursuing to support. In the following, we provide quantitative 
information on technological trends, as identified by major 
consulting firms and organisations. Regarding the analysis of 
trends, we gathered information from reports provided by 
Deloitte; PriceWaterhouseCoopers; Ernst & Young; KPMG; 
Gartner; Computer Economics and Accenture. Exploring in more 
detail the various technological trend lists provided by these 
firms, we extracted many similarities amongst them. This is 
something to be expected since all trends stem from the latest 
individuals’, organisations’ and technological need, and also 
helps in identifying the main areas that the majority of businesses 
are focusing on for the next three years. Table I (middle column) 
shows the number of trends categorised in each viewpoint. 
Specifically, the results imply that the majority of trends fall into 
the ‘technology’ area; ‘organisation’ comes second and 
‘individual’ follows in third place.  
Regarding the analysis of trends, they were examined in the 
context of business and IT systems since none of the reports refer 
explicitly to ICS. On the contrary, governments and organisations 
have already identified the need for examining threats in ICS. 
Specifically, information regarding threats in ICS was extracted 
from reports by ENISA [1, 13], NIST [14] and ISO/IEC PDTR 
13335-12. It is noteworthy that the human factor (conceived as 
‘individual’ in OTI) has been characterised as a challenge due to 
humans’ lack of interest and/or understanding of security issues 
in ICS. Therefore, having examined the threats identified in ICS 
by the above mentioned reports, we also categorised them 
according to the OTI viewpoints. The number of threats in each 
viewpoint is depicted in Table I (last column). Specifically, it is 
shown that the human factor consists of a major threat for ICS; 
technology turns out to be the second most important source of 
threat, followed by organisational issues. Our results appear to be 
in line with recent major security incidents such as the attack on 
the German steel mill and the attack on the Ukrainian electric 
power industry occurred in late 2014 and 2015, respectively. In 
both cases, the attackers initiated spear phishing attacks to gain 
access to the production networks, something that indicates the 
importance of human behaviour in critical infrastructures.  
TABLE I. OTI BASED CLASSIFICATION OF TRENDS AND THREATS 
Viewpoint Num. of trends Num. of threats 
Organisation 35 10 
Technology 37 21 
Individual 17 25 
IV. PREREQUISITE INFORMATION 
This section provides prerequisite information with regard to 
our approach towards achieving resilience in critical 
infrastructures. Specifically, we consider a resilience strategy in 
place to cope with the emerging challenges in critical 
infrastructures. Our resilience strategy is capable of embracing 
(cyber) situational awareness. The latter sets its own processes, in 
order for a threat awareness architecture to be based on solid and 
concrete phases and to provide eventually the adequate level of 
security and safety required by critical infrastructures. In the 
following, we elaborate on resilience and our resilience strategy, 
provide information about (cyber) situational awareness and its 
main phases. This information set the basis for the threat 
awareness architecture proposed in section V. 
A. Resilience strategy 
The term ‘resilience’ has been used in the past several decades 
in different ways to describe the ability of materials, engineered 
artefacts, ecosystems, communities, etc., to adapt to changes, and 
is also adopted by sciences (e.g., psychology) and organisations 
(e.g., business continuity lifecycles) [15]. Although the 
etymology of resilience clearly refers to the capacity to recover 
from difficulties, a single agreed definition is currently elusive. 
This is mostly because of the complexity and diversity of 
contemporary socio-technical systems, which eventually resulted 
in the many definitions of resilience. Our resilience strategy, 
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Fig. 2. Threat awareness for utility networks 
entitled D2R2+DR (Defend, Detect, Remediate, Recover, and 
Diagnose and Refine), defines resilience as ‘the ability of a 
network or system to provide and maintain an acceptable level of 
service in the face of various faults and challenges to normal 
operation’ [16]. Defend, Detect, Remediate, and Recover consist 
processes of an internal loop process and Diagnose and Refine 
processes of an outer loop. In more detail, it is: Defend against 
challenges and threats to normal operation; Detect when an 
adverse event or condition has occurred; Remediate the effects of 
the adverse event or condition; Recover to original and normal 
operations; Diagnose the fault that was the root cause; and Refine 
behaviour for the future based on past D2R2+DR cycles.  
B. Situational awareness 
SA is defined by the Committee on National Security Systems 
as ‘within a volume of time and space, the perception of an 
enterprise’s security posture and its threat environment; the 
comprehension/meaning of both taken together (risk); and the 
projection of their status into the near future’. Cyber SA can be 
defined as the part of SA that is concerned with cyber 
environments [5]. Following, we elaborate on cyber SA in utility 
networks, and further continue with the introduction of threat 
awareness (TA) architecture in the context of cyber SA. The 
latter is able to identify and assess threats; exchange threat 
information; and help in decision-making with regard to risks. To 
the best of our knowledge, none of the existing approaches in SA 
and ICS are coping with the incorporation of non-technical 
information, i.e., threat information that may stem also from an 
organisational or individual’s perspective. SA and resilience are 
examined in [4, 17] as a mean towards providing proactive 
network resilience management. In this paper, we examine SA in 
the context of our resilience strategy as a mean towards providing 
threat awareness in critical infrastructures. 
C. Cyber situational awareness 
Utility networks operate in complex environments where 
interactions take place amongst the assets of the network, the 
participating people and the ICS. Any of these might be 
vulnerable to various types of threats, and therefore, become a 
risk for the network. ENISA identified in [1] a list of 15 threats in 
the emerging technology area of critical infrastructures. Although 
this information is valuable in terms of current and emerging 
threats in ICS, it is not possible to fully cover the wide variety of 
ICS systems and their evolving environment. Therefore, in the 
context of providing a holistic approach towards protecting utility 
networks, we propose the application of the OTI viewpoint-based 
approach as a first step towards achieving cyber SA in utility 
networks. Cyber SA is crucial to apply in networks in order to 
safeguard sensitive data, sustain fundamental operations, and 
protect infrastructures. Furthermore, cyber SA was identified as 
an attractive approach by the FOI Swedish Defence Research 
Agency, which is capable of copying with the complexity 
provided by ICS [5]. Cyber SA can be applied as a three-phase 
process [18, 19]. The main phases are: situation recognition, 
situation comprehension and situation projection. Each one of 
these phases consists of several aspects [19]. More specifically, 
situation recognition includes the aspects of being aware of the 
current situation and of the quality of the collected situation 
aware information items, as well as, the knowledge, intelligence 
and decisions that are derived from these information items. 
Situation comprehension includes the aspects of being aware of 
the impact of an attack, the adversary behaviour and of why and 
how the current situation is caused. Lastly, situation projection 
includes the aspects of being aware of how situations evolve and 
assesses plausible futures of the current situation. The application 
of cyber SA in utility networks will help in achieving an accurate 
awareness of these networks and a complete understanding of the 
operations that can take place in them. Performing a proper 
assessment of the operations in utility networks will also help to 
discover potential weak areas and vulnerabilities, and to assess 
potential threats to prevent them in their early stage of dispersion. 
V. THREAT AWARENESS ARCHITECTURE 
Threat Awareness (TA) is considered to be an essential 
component of a security programme. Symantec defines it as ‘the 
monitoring, identification, analysis, and notification of potential 
threats or vulnerabilities that can cause harm to system and 
network environments’. The term is enriched by MITRE, stating 
that TA needs also to incorporate knowledge of external threat 
information, and to participate in cross-industry or cross-
government communities to share information regarding threats’ 
possible indicators and warnings. In this section, we further 
elaborate on a TA architecture that is able to incorporate all the 
above characteristics. The architecture is based on the SA stages 
described in [19]. Therefore, the distinct stages for TA are 
divided into those of situation recognition, situation 
comprehension and situation projection. The proposed TA 
architecture for application in ICS is depicted in Fig. 2.  
The first stage consists that of situation recognition. During 
this stage, two requirements are fulfilled, i.e., being aware of the 
current situation, and ensure the quality of the collected situation 
aware items [19]. These items should be characterised by 
truthfulness, completeness and freshness. In order for the 
requirements to be accomplished, we propose to initially apply 
the OTI viewpoints to be aware of the current trends that will 
lead to the exposure of emerging threats within the examined 
utility network. This step requires a high cognitive knowledge 
level of the organisation’s procedures, technical infrastructure 
and individuals. Our research work under this stage includes, 
amongst other, the implementation of a framework that supports 
the detection of anomalies by using appropriate techniques at the 
different levels of critical infrastructure and service [20]. At this 
stage, it is possible to incorporate threat information from other 
utility networks. This consists of an operation that could be 
automated and will provide better protection due to the existence 
of a collectively stronger cyber-security ecosystem. Exchange of 
threat information should be based on existing data exchange 
formats for the sharing of threat intelligence. Such solutions are 
OpenIOC, TAXII™, and RID. More information on existing 
solutions can be found in [21]. Existing threat catalogues can be 
incorporated, nevertheless, the complexity of this type of socio-
technical systems may require additional processes such as the 
performance of interviews with the operators or ethnographic 
studies to populate custom threat catalogues per case. These steps 
may help in the creation of a threats pool. The latter could have 
two different sources of input. The first consists of threats 
identified within the utility network using the OTI viewpoint 
approach. The second source of input contains threats retrieved 
from other networks. The next step includes the use of a set of 
cognition processes to transit to the second stage of situation 
comprehension. The cognition processes in this stage will try to 
describe the type of the identified threats; their source, target, 
etc., that is information required for providing structured 
information for newly identified threats. 
In the second stage of the TA architecture, we work towards 
achieving situation comprehension. As input to this stage, we 
assume the knowledge information created from its prior stage. 
The importance of this information is two-fold; firstly, newly 
defined threats are pushed to a central threat repository in order 
to share threat knowledge. For the definition of the structured 
threat information existing languages could be used, such as 
STIX™ and IODEF. Secondly, the structured threat information 
is used in a series of judgement processes. The latter aim to 
facilitate threat assessment, which includes analysing their 
behaviour and helping to resolve questions with regard to the 
threats’ origin and purpose. Such judgement processes include, 
but are not limited to, vulnerability analysis and threat 
assessment; attack trend and intent analysis; causality analysis, 
and forensics [19]. These judgement processes can result in 
gradually increasing the awareness of a situation in utility 
networks. For instance, not all of the defined threats might be 
exploitable in the infrastructure of a utility network. That will be 
the case if the vulnerability for exploiting a specific threat is 
absent. This inputs valuable information to the next phase of the 
threat awareness architecture. It is worthy to note that during the 
phase of situation comprehension, various types of security 
information, not only related to threats, but also related to 
vulnerabilities, can be identified and described in existing 
formats (e.g., CVE, OSVDB, CVRF). This information can be 
examined on the basis of the infrastructures, and therefore, could 
also be collected by applying the OTI approach. The latter will 
result in the collection of vulnerabilities not only restricted to the 
technical aspects of an infrastructure (e.g., technical 
vulnerability, or misconfiguration in software, systems, or 
networks), but instead will additionally expose, include and 
convey organisational and individual based vulnerabilities. 
The phase of situation projection is concerned with being 
aware of how a threat might evolve to assess plausible futures. 
This information helps in decision-making, i.e., a cognitive 
process in selecting an action that will eventually lead the system 
in a secure and safe state. Security and safety consist of the main 
objectives of the decision making process. For instance, if during 
the previous phase an exploitable threat is identified in an 
infrastructure, it will require from the current phase to assess 
plausible futures of it, and also to get a decision with regard to its 
mitigation. The latter is required for reaching a secure and safe 
state. If a threat is not exploitable in an infrastructure, the thread 
can be considered as not real, and therefore, assume that the 
system is in a secure and safe state. Consequently, after ensuring 
the secure and safe state of the system, the new state operates as a 
feedback for the threat awareness process. Within this feedback, 
it also has to be ensured that the infrastructure does not evolve 
into a state, in which some threats become exploitable again due 
to mitigation actions taken in this phase. The proposed 
architecture is different from existing solutions since it is not 
bounded only to information sharing, but instead is looking 
towards providing a holistic approach to gain threat awareness. 
Therefore, solutions such as the Malware Information Sharing 
Platform and Microsoft’s Interflow could be incorporated to 
provide a concrete threat awareness platform.  
After elaborating on the type of processes that can take place 
within each of the main phases of TA, we provide a mapping 
between the latter and our resilience strategy. TA provides a 
solution for some of the steps of D2R2+DR, and therefore, a 
complete resilience solution may require the existence of 
additional components to introduce functionalities as defend 
measures (e.g., by setting in place security controls), remediation 
and recovery. Hence, the capabilities of the TA architecture are 
mainly concentrated on the detection of challenges and threats 
via situation recognition; the provision of diagnostic information 
through situation comprehension; and, the refinement of future 
behaviours of systems via situation projection. Nevertheless, we 
have presented in [17], how the remaining steps of the resilience 
TABLE II.  THREAT CATALOGUE 
Viewpoint Asset Threat Vulnerability Impact 
Organisation Network component Missing password policy  Access to network component’s 
control panel using default credentials 
Reconfiguration of component 
Technology SCADA workstation Software vulnerabilities 
or errors 
Prone to multiple vulnerabilities Disclosure of information; privilege escalation; 
DoS conditions 
Camera server Software vulnerabilities 
or errors 
Prone to remote code execution 
vulnerability 
Execution of arbitrary code; DoS conditions 
Individual Operators Social engineering Prone to spear-phishing attacks   Provide access to internal network components 
 
strategy can be covered in an overall resilience architecture by 
using external components to provide the additional set of 
services.  
VI. CASE STUDY 
In [22] we elaborated on a case study where we examined and 
analysed the potential impact of attacks in the context of social 
engineering in a European utility company. In this paper, we map 
the processes we followed in [22] with the stages in the proposed 
TA architecture. Nevertheless, detailed information about the 
assurance techniques used and qualitative metrics evaluated in 
the case study are available in [22].  
Since the TA architecture considers issues across each OTI 
viewpoint, the inclusion or adaptation of any method that could 
support them was vital. While existing methods [23-27] provide 
interesting insight into the assessment of security, it appears 
some may face challenges when considering multiple OTI 
viewpoints. Through basic adaptation, the method in [28] appears 
to provide a good starting point. Specifically, that includes the 
application of the Mean Time-to-Compromise (MTTC) metric 
[28], i.e., an attack graph that highlights nodes within the ICS, 
and their accompanying MTTC. Attack paths can then be 
generated, including also the total time to compromise target 
nodes. Following a holistic view of ICS security [29], it is 
possible also to cover systems/devices residing in levels 0-5 of 
the Purdue model [30]. Considering the MTTC metric for our 
assessment, we applied the following steps to perform an 
assessment of a utility company: (1) system architecture review; 
(2) shared threat information review; (3) e-mail access review; 
(4) conceptual social engineering (malicious e-mails) review; (5) 
technical vulnerability assessment; (6) calculation of MTTC for 
each system node; (7) attack graph generation based on specified 
target node (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
workstation); (8) overlay of ICS levels (0-5) onto the attack 
graph; and (9) highlighting the nodes susceptible to selected 
social engineering attack vectors (malicious e-mails). With 
regard to the mapping of the previous steps into the TA 
architecture: steps 1-3 map to the phase of situational recognition 
and steps 4-9 map to the phase of situation comprehension. Once 
completed, the outputs can be used during the situation projection 
stage as a baseline on which to review any prospective changes. 
This includes the addition/removal of nodes, security controls, 
etc. In overlaying all applicable ICS levels (step 7), we extend on 
the work by [31], providing further granularity as discussed in 
[29]. Applying the results from step 3 in step 9, demonstrates the 
flexibility of the proposed approach to include non-technical 
challenges. Steps 3, 4 and 9 were an output of step 2 in which 
shared threat information suggests ICS could become targeted via 
e-mail based attacks. 
The result of the assessment process was the generation of a 
MTTC attack, as depicted Fig. 3. The shortest MTTC path is 
highlighted with blue arrows, in both a penetrative and 
destructive context (i.e., take control of the system, or cause it to 
fail). The oval nodes represent the nodes capability to receive e-
mails. Via the performance of interviews with individuals in the 
examined organisation, we identified that 41% of users would 
action the malicious e-mail (i.e., phishing and spear-phishing) 
content. This increased to 50% when the sender of the e-mail was 
a colleague. In the case of a successful attack, the perimeter 
breach could be bypassed, providing direct internal system 
access, and thus, reducing the shortest attack path by 
approximately 47%. 
 
Fig. 3. Compromise graph [22] 
In Table II, we provide a short threat catalogue in the context 
of the OTI viewpoints, prepared as an output of the assurance 
techniques applied in the case study. For privacy and safety 
reasons, a number of threats and their detail have been omitted or 
simplified. Specifically, the information includes some of the 
assets in the utility network; threats to them; identified 
vulnerabilities and the potential impact of successfully exploiting 
a vulnerability. Assets are mapped with only few of the 
components referred to in Fig. 3 for the reasons stated above.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Investigating the nature and diversity of trends and threats in 
utility networks has amplified our understanding of the potential 
dangers these may introduce in critical infrastructures. The 
application of Organisation, Technology, and Individual (OTI) 
viewpoints has shown that the majority of trends fall under the 
category of ‘technology’, but ‘individuals’ clearly pose a 
significant threat to utility networks. Although this might be 
expected, its confirmation via OTI indicates that their 
identification could potentially be systematised. Additionally, the 
proposed Threat Awareness (TA) architecture may operate as a 
future protective means in the context of a resilience strategy. 
Overall, we have shown that the protection of critical 
infrastructures is not a single but rather a multi-variable problem, 
which requires the incorporation of information stemming from 
various viewpoints of a networked system. Furthermore, the 
identification and assessment of threats would not be sufficient to 
introduce the appropriate level of resilience in utility networks. 
The proposed TA architecture embraces existing technologies 
and processes in the context of our resilience strategy to fulfil 
that objective. Through a case study, we demonstrated the use of 
the TA architecture as an orchestration architecture for existing 
risk assessment methods, which could provide meaningful and 
easy-to-understand results to industrial control systems operators. 
Finally, we have already engaged in research towards the 
automation of some of the TA processes [20], which we 
anticipate will result in improving the overall efficiency and 
effectiveness of our approach. 
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